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A Proposal for a Reformed and Strengthened
United Nations Security Council1
Richard Barron Parker2
In a world where modern technology enables small groups of fanatics to
kill millions of people and bands of thugs to take over failed states, more
intervention by the international community in the sovereignty of individual
nations will be necessary.
Such intervention cannot be left to the United States acting alone or with
just a few allies. In the first place, the United States does not have the
administrative, military, or financial capacity to carry out all of the interven-
tions that will be necessary in the next several years even for the protection
of its own self-interest narrowly conceived.
Even when it is willing to commit resources to an intervention, the United
States acting alone, or with just a few allies, will often lack the political legiti-
macy and authority necessary to have its decision to intervene accepted by
the rest of the world. Without such acceptance, any intervention becomes
more difficult and more costly in American lives and money.
Three years ago, discussion of the future role of the United Nations Secu-
rity Council was polarized between contemptuous dismissal of the Council
and the bland assumption that the outmoded structure of the Council was
fine as it was.
Times have changed. There is a growing worldwide consensus that
more intervention in the sovereignty of nations will be necessary and that
the current structure of the Council is inadequate. Nations are jostling
for seats on the Council, the place where many of the decisions to inter-
1. Copyright © Richard Barron Parker (2006).
2. Haverford College, BA (1962); Brown University, MA (Philosophy, 1963); Univer-
sity of Chicago, PhD (Philosophy, 1968); Harvard Law School, JD (1971); Profes-
sor of Law, Hiroshima Shudo University since 1990.
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vene will be made. Proposals for changing the structure of the Council
abound.
What structural changes are necessary to produce a more effective United
Nations Security Council?
At a minimum, a reformed Security Council should not be subject to pa-
ralysis by the veto power of any single nation. A reformed Council must
be small enough to function efficiently, yet large enough to represent a ma-
jority of the world’s population in its membership. Any proposal for reform
must be acceptable to the current five permanent members and must be
supported by a majority of the General Assembly. None of the proposals
currently under discussion meets these tests. The following proposal just
might work.
My proposal is divided into four parts. The first part concerns the selec-
tion of the members of a reformed Security Council. The second and third
parts deal with the elimination of the veto power and suggest how the cur-
rent five permanent members might be persuaded to give up the
veto. The fourth part argues that it is the self-interest of the United States
to support reform of the sort proposed.
Selecting the Members of a Reformed Security Council
Instead of naming particular countries as permanent members, two
simple criteria — population and economic size — would be used to select
Council members. A reformed Security Council would include the ten
most populous countries in the world, the ten largest economies in the
world, plus four members elected to staggered two-year terms by the Gen-
eral Assembly, two members to be elected every year. A country that was
in the top ten in both population and economic size would have two seats on
the Council and thus two votes on all matters before the Council. If a
Council member’s population or economy dropped out of the top ten, that
member would lose their seat based on population or economic size.
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As part of the package to secure agreement of the current five permanent
members to this reform, each current permanent member would be granted
one additional permanent seat on the reformed Council in additional to any
seats granted on the basis of either population or economic size.
This model would give a seat based on population to China, India, the
United States, Indonesia, Brazil, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Russia, Nigeria, and
Japan.3 Economic size would give a seat to the United States, China, Japan,
India, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Brazil, and Russia.4 Cur-
rent permanent status would give one additional (permanent) seat to China,
France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Four addi-
tional members would be elected to two-year terms by the General Assem-
bly.
In sum, 15 nations would have a total of 29 seats. China, Russia, and the
United States would have three seats each based on their population, their
economic size, and their current permanent seat on the old Council.
France and the United Kingdom would have two seats each based on the
size of their economies and their permanent seats on the old Council.
Brazil, India, and Japan would have two seats each based on their popula-
tion and economic size. Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Pakistan
would each have one seat based on their population. Italy and Germany
would each have one seat based on their economic size. In sum, the distri-
bution of seats in 2006 would be as follows:
China 3 seats
Russia 3 seats
United States 3 seats
France 2 seats
3. Rankings of the size of national populations are from http://www.census.gov/cgi-
bin/ipc/idbrank.pl
4. Rankings of the size of national economies, using purchasing power parity, are
from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP_
PPP.pdf
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United Kingdom 2 seats
Brazil 2 seats
India 2 seats
Japan 2 seats
Bangladesh 1 seat
Indonesia 1 seat
Nigeria 1 seat
Pakistan 1 seat
Germany 1 seat
Italy 1 seat
Nation elected by General Assembly 1 seat
Nation elected by General Assembly 1 seat
Nation elected by General Assembly 1 seat
Nation elected by General Assembly 1 seat
18 Nations 29 seats.
The reformed Security Council would represent well more than half of
the world’s population and most of its economic and military might. It
would include the three largest Muslim nations in the world. Other na-
tions with large populations or large economies that are not quite in the top
ten such as Mexico, Egypt, Spain, South Korea, South Africa, or Canada
might be among the four nations to be elected to the council by the General
Assembly. The African Union, with 53 members out of a total of 191 in the
General Assembly, would be a powerful voice in the selection of the four
nations elected by the General Assembly.
In recent months, as enthusiasm for changing the structure of the Secu-
rity Council has grown around the world, arguments for and against mem-
bership for specified countries are being heard. China is saying that Japan
has not been sufficiently apologetic for its World War II atrocities and so
does not deserve to be a member of the Security Council. Japan could re-
ply by pointing to the atrocious behavior of the Chinese in Tibet, or the
murder under Mao of millions of Chinese by their own government, or by
pointing out that China is not yet a democracy.
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Membership on the new Council cannot depend on an evaluation of a
nation’s virtue. There is not sufficient agreement worldwide on which
nations are more virtuous than others.
Democracy may be a suitable criterion for entrance into the European
Union, but if a democratic government is made a requirement for member-
ship on the Security Council, the Council would not reflect the world as it
is. Arguments over what democracy is and how much democracy is
required would paralyze reform.
A major advantage of the proposal is that nations would have their seats
on the new Council not because they are more virtuous or more democratic
than others, but for the more objective and more universally acceptable rea-
son that they are among the ten most populous nations and/or the ten larg-
est economies in the world, or because they have been elected by the Gen-
eral Assembly.
The neutral principle that justifies the award of twenty seats based on size
of population and economy is that the Council needs to reflect the real bal-
ance of hard and soft power in the world, something the current Council
fails to do.
Population as a criterion of Council membership has the additional advan-
tage of conferring some democratic legitimacy on the Council even though
the government of a large non-democratic nation may not “represent” that
country’s population.
Economic power is important not only in itself but also as a index to mili-
tary power, an important qualification for Security Council membership but
not one that should be rewarded directly. Nations should not be rewarded
for having large armed forces but, as a matter of fact, the largest economies
do support the largest armed forces. Generally, there is a rough equiva-
lence among larger nations between economic size and military power.
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In the case of those nations elected to the Council by the General Assem-
bly, that election is what justifies their sitting on the Council.
In the future, as the economies of France, Italy, the United Kingdom and
Russia become smaller relative to those of other nations, they would likely
each lose a seat. If they chose, France, Italy, Germany, and the United
Kingdom could be replaced on the Security Council by European Union
representatives. The EU would then have four seats based on its large
population and economy and the grandfathered permanent seats of France
and the United Kingdom. The same substitution of representatives might
be used by other groupings of nations that integrate as the EU may do and
have a single foreign policy. Nations coming together for purposes of Se-
curity Council representation might keep their individual memberships in
the General Assembly.
On Sovereignty and the Veto
A guaranteed permanent seat and additional seats based on population
and economic size are probably not enough to persuade the five current
permanent members to give up their veto — their right to stop any Security
Council resolution from passing. Why not?
The one word answer is sovereignty. Each of the current five permanent
members has vital interests on which it might not be able to command a
majority of support on the reformed Security Council. For China, it might
be Tibet or Xinjiang or Taiwan. For Russia, Chechnya. For the United
States, Israel, Iran, Iraq, or Taiwan. Under the present system, whenever a
permanent member fears that it will be outvoted in the Council, the perma-
nent member can veto or threaten a veto and end discussion. Council
members with a veto need not take seriously the views of other members.
As a result, when one of the five permanent members of the Security Coun-
cil fundamentally disagrees with a resolution or a possible resolution, the
Security Council becomes useless even as a forum for discussion, much
less as a body that can act effectively.
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The veto power has been the major cause of the ineffectiveness of the Se-
curity Council over the sixty years of its existence. During the Cold War,
vetoes or the threat of vetoes from either the United States or the Soviet
Union paralyzed the Council. The United Nations went to war on the side
of South Korea in 1950 only because the Soviet Union was boycotting the
Security Council when the vote to intervene was taken.
In 1999, China and Russia made clear that they would veto any UN action
toward Serbia. The United States and NATO intervened without the sup-
port of the United Nations.
In 2003, the United States gave up requesting Security Council support
when it became clear that France and perhaps other nations would veto any
resolution calling for the invasion of Iraq.
In 2006, the Security Council may again be sidelined in the matter of
Iran’s nuclear program because of the threat of a veto from China or Russia.
Elimination of the veto would clearly strengthen the influence of the
Council because discussion of any issue could continue to a final vote on
any proposed resolution. Given the more representative character of a
reformed Security Council, the weight of world opinion might be shown to
be against the United States on the question of Israel or Iraq, or against
China on Tibet or Iran, or against Russia on Chechnya or Iran. What
might persuade these nations to give up the power to stop discussion on
any of these matters?
My proposal is that the United Nations Charter be amended so that Security
Council resolutions are not binding on United Nations member states.
Resolutions could give specific nations or groups of nations permission for
the use of military force, but they would not compel nations to use their
military forces for interventions they opposed. Furthermore, if they chose,
member states could use military force to oppose an intervention approved
by the reformed Council without violating the Charter. As a matter of in-
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ternational law, Security Council decisions could not override the sovereign
decision of a member state to oppose an intervention.
To illustrate, suppose that the reformed Security Council voted 20 to 9 to
permit the Arab states to intervene militarily in Israel to secure the estab-
lishment of a Palestinian State. The United States would be permitted by
an amended United Nations Charter to use military force to oppose that
intervention.
The proposal represents a major change in the basic purposes of the United
Nations. As originally conceived, the United Nations was a collective secu-
rity arrangement in which the victors of World War II tried to bind one
another contractually to keep the peace. The model was the old League of
Nations.
Article 2 of the current United Nations Charter sets out the basic prin-
ciples that the member nations must honor. One of these principles is,
“All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action
it takes in accordance with the present charter, and shall refrain from giving
assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preven-
tive or enforcement action.”5
In a reformed United Nations, this principle would be given up. Every
nation would retain the right to refuse to support and even to use force to
oppose an intervention authorized by a Security Council resolution and still
remain a member in good standing of the United Nations.
In sum, the old ideal of the Security Council as an international legislature
would be given up. Unless this fundamental change is made, the five per-
manent members will not give up their veto power.
5. See Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter at http://www.un.org/
aboutun/charter/
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What must be given up is the ideal of the United Nations as a world gov-
ernment of which member states are citizens. In the current world govern-
ment model, the Security Council is a super legislature, Security Council
resolutions are laws, and member states are bound to follow those resolu-
tions for the same reasons that citizens of a state are bound to follow the
laws of their state.
Because the current United Nations Charter embodies this world govern-
ment model, the veto power is seen by citizens of the states possessing the
veto as a device for ensuring that they will not be bound by laws not of their
own making. Rejecting Security Council reform is seen as similar to reject-
ing membership in the European Union because citizens do not want the
laws that govern their lives to be made in Brussels.
In the model I am suggesting, a Security Council resolution could legiti-
mize an intervention by a state or a group of states in the internal affairs of
another state, but such a resolution would not be legally binding on any UN
member. When the Security Council voted to intervene in some way that
violated the normal sovereignty of a nation, the members who disagreed
with that resolution would not be bound to participate in enforcing that
resolution and indeed could oppose its enforcement by force, and still
remain members in good standing of the Security Council and/or of the
General Assembly
To return to the example mentioned above, many in the United States
would oppose doing away with the veto because the veto can now be used
by the United States to protect Israel against a possible Security Council
resolution authorizing the Arab states to intervene militarily in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict on the side of the Palestinians. After reform, the
United States would not be able to veto such a resolution but as a matter of
international law under the United Nations Charter, the United States would
be free to use military force to protect Israel’s sovereignty from the inter-
vention permitted by the resolution.
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Objectors will say that this reform would reduce the Security Council to a
debating society. This is true only in a legal sense. In a reformed Council,
the current five permanent members could not stop debate by using or
threatening to use their veto. Voting in a reformed Security Council would
more clearly reflect the real balance of power and opinion in the world.
Whatever the Council lost in legal authority, it would gain in social and
political authority. The legitimacy and thus the effectiveness and useful-
ness of the Security Council would be increased.
Whether one opposes or supports this change may depend on one’s view
of the role of nation states in the world. Are nation states an obstacle to
world peace or are they a necessary condition for world peace?
If nation states are seen as part of the problem, and the United Nations is
seen as a potential world government, as an eventual replacement for the
nation state, then my reform will seem to go in the wrong direction.
People believing this will oppose any cutback in the legally binding nature
of Security Council resolutions. But then they will be stuck with the veto
and the present weak Security Council.
If self-governing nation states are seen as necessary to world peace, then
the United Nations should be a place where nations can express their views,
bargain among themselves, and agree to cooperate on interventions they
deem necessary. The veto power undermines this possibility and should
be eliminated even at the cost of surrendering the legal authority to bind
members to majority opinion.
The current legal structure of United Nations pits the Security Council
against the sovereignty of the members that comprise the Council. The
Security Council currently has the legal authority under the present Charter
to override the sovereign decisions of member nations. No wonder the
veto power is treasured by the five nations that have it. It ensures their
freedom from Council decisions by making it impossible for the Council to
make a decision.
Richard Barron Parker : A Proposal for a Reformed and Strengthened
United Nations Security Council
61―　　― 272（272）
My suggested change removes the conflict between the protection of
sovereignty and Security Council resolutions. Nation states are free to
express their agreement or disagreement with Security Council resolutions.
Those that do not agree are free to oppose militarily actions taken in
accord with the resolutions of the Council majority. They will still be
members in good standing of the international community but they will not
escape the full weight of world opinion as expressed by a truly representa-
tive world body.
Is the Proposed Reform Politically Feasible?
Any proposal for reform must be acceptable to the current five permanent
members and must be supported by a majority of the General Assembly.
The proposed reform would certainly be acceptable to the major nations
of the world other than the five current permanent members. Brazil,
Bangladesh, Germany, India, Italy, Indonesia, Japan, Nigeria, and Pakistan
would each be given seats based on the size of their population and/or their
economy. Other major nations such as Egypt and Mexico would either
qualify in the future on the basis of their growing population or economy, or
would almost certainly be elected to a reformed Council by the large num-
ber of smaller nations in their region.
Smaller nations would have more input into Security Council decisions
than they do now. The General Assembly would be electing two Council
members each year. At first these representatives would tend to be repre-
sent regions such as Africa or South America. Over time, individual
nations running for the seats elected by the General Assembly might take
specific positions on issues that closely divided the reformed Security
Council. The yearly elections would allow all of the members of the Gen-
eral Assembly to vote for candidate nations that supported their views on
those issues.
The elimination of the veto is an advantageous reform for every nation
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not now possessing the veto. But is the elimination of the veto a win-win
solution? Would the five permanent members agree to give up their veto
power? Let us look at each one of the permanent members separately.
China would have three seats — parity with the United States — and a
permanent advantage over India which would have two seats. More impor-
tant for China might be the elimination of the world government model
from the Charter.
Even more than the Americans, the Chinese see the veto as an essential
protection of their sovereignty. In the United States, the country most
responsible for the founding of the United Nations, there is still a large
Wilsonian minority of the citizens that favor the world government model
and see the nation state as one of the obstacles to world peace. China
takes a more zero-sum view of the rise and fall of states. The only world
government acceptable to China would be a Chinese government.
The Chinese often abstain in Security Council votes. They are not cru-
saders for abstract universal values. They might agree to give up the veto
if in return the ability of the Security Council to legally bind China was per-
manently removed from the United Nations Charter.
Russia may be the hardest country to sell on the proposed reform.
Russia’s decline in population and in the relative size of its economy means
that Russia will eventually lose its second and third seats on a reformed
Council to two developing countries. The main reason that they might
give up the veto is that, in exchange, other permanent members, especially
China and the United States, would also lose their veto power. The Rus-
sians would need to believe that a stronger Security Council, in which they
played a permanent but lesser role, was more in Russia’s long term interest
than having the veto power in the current weak Council. The Russians
would also be attracted to the revision of the Charter that would allow them
to act contrary to Council resolutions and still remain a member in good
standing of the Council.
Richard Barron Parker : A Proposal for a Reformed and Strengthened
United Nations Security Council
63―　　― 270（270）
Both the United Kingdom and France are less isolated diplomatically
than China or Russia. They are part of a European project that, if it suc-
ceeds, would be entitled to four seats on the Council, more than either the
United States or China. Because they are smaller and geopolitically less
ambitious, they are less likely to be defeated on issues of vital interest to
them than Russia, China, or the United States. They would welcome a
stronger more influential Security Council that would not be subject to the
veto power of the United States, or China, or Russia. If China, Russia, and
the United States agreed to give up their veto, the French and the British
would likely follow suit.
A Reformed Security Council is in the Enlightened
Self-Interest of the United States
Recent polling by The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press
shows that a majority of the world’s people are now anti-American.6 This is
not good for American well-being or American security. The illusion that
many Americans have that the American five percent of the world’s popula-
tion can bully or dominate the rest is hard for non-Americans to understand.
Americans seem to be treating the rest of the world as if it were North
America in the 19th Century. In 19th Century North America, Americans
could dominate the Indian tribes, and the Mexicans, and even the British in
Oregon because of an enormous advantage in population. They do not
have that advantage when they take on the world. The asymmetrical war-
fare practiced by opponents of the Americans, combined with the existence
of biological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction, has lessened the
usefulness of conventional military forces. The Americans have squan-
dered much of their soft power over the last few years.
Americans need to return to the projects of enlightened self-interest that
won them leadership of the world. World leadership is possible only if oth-
6. The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press http://people-press.org/
does state-of-the-art polling on world public opinion and global attitudes towards
the United States.
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ers consent to follow, and the only way to secure consent from a knowing
world is to have national aims and goals that benefit most of mankind at the
same time they benefit America. A reformed Council representative of the
world could be the forum where the consent of the world for American
projects could be openly and visibly obtained. The absence of the veto will
allow for the open democratic exchange of opinions that Americans are
used to and see as the model for how serious disagreements should be
handled.
Reform of the United Nations, and especially of the Security Council, is a
good place for the United States to begin to reassert its lost leadership
role. The United Nations is essentially an American invention. A
reformed, structurally stronger Security Council is politically a realistic pos-
sibility if the United States supports it. The United States has little to fear
in giving up its veto power and a great deal to gain. Even the United States
needs the help of a stronger Security Council to achieve national security.
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